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Abstract: This paper analyses empirically how differences in local taxes affect the 
intraregional location of new manufacturing plants. These effects are examined within the 
random profit maximization framework while accounting for the presence of different 
types of agglomeration economies (localization/ urbanization/ Jacobs’ economies) at the 
municipal level. We look at the location decision of more than 10,000 establishments 
locating between 1996 and 2003 across more than 400 municipalities in Catalonia, a 
Spanish region. It is necessary to restrict the choice set to the local labor market and, above 
all, to control for agglomeration economies so as to identify the effects of taxes on the 
location of new establishments. 
JEL Classification: R3, H32. 
Keywords: Local taxes, agglomeration economies, firm location. 
 
Resumen: Este artículo analiza a nivel empírico el papel de los impuestos locales en la 
localización intra-regional de nuevos establecimientos manufactureros. Estos efectos son 
analizados en un modelo de maximización aleatoria de beneficios “random profit 
maximization”, teniendo en cuenta la presencia de distintas economías de aglomeración 
(localización/ urbanización/ Jacobs) a nivel municipal. En concreto, estudiamos la decisión 
de localización de más de 10.000 nuevos establecimientos manufactureros, que se 
establecen en más 400 municipios de la región española de Cataluña. Para identificar el 
efecto de los impuestos locales en la localización de los nuevos establecimientos es preciso 
restringir el conjunto de elección al mercado de trabajo local y, sobretodo, controlar la 
presencia de economías de aglomeración. 
Clasificación JEL: R3, H32. 
Palabras clave: Impuestos locales, economías de aglomeración, localización de empresas. 
 1. Introduction 
 
The effect of taxation on the location of economic activity is an issue that has interested scholars 
and policy makers alike. Knowing the extent to which firms respond to tax differentials is an 
issue of major concern for tax setting governments. In particular, governments may want to 
foresee the outflow of firms following a tax increase in order to assess how tax revenues and 
local employment are affected by changes in tax rates. A high degree of sensitivity to tax 
differentials on the part of firms can, thus, erode the tax autonomy of governments that may be 
engaged in tax competition processes1. 
 
Although initial attempts at quantifying empirically the impact of taxes on the location of 
economic activities date back some decades the question is far from being resolved. Studies 
carried out during the sixties and seventies, mainly in the U.S., reached the conclusion that 
regional and local tax bills did not play a significant role in firms’ location decisions. It was 
argued that as these taxes were so small, tax differentials were offset by other location factors. 
Yet, during the eighties a number of studies, again conducted in the U.S., reported a significant 
role being played by taxes in the location of economic activities2. Analyses of this type have not 
flourished to the same degree in Europe. Houdebine and Schneider (1997) and Buettner (2003) 
find that local taxes affect the location of economic activities to some extent in France and 
Germany, respectively. Duranton et al. (2006) conclude that local taxes in the UK have a 
negative impact on employment but no effect on firm entry. For Spain, Solé-Ollé and 
Viladecans-Marsal (2003) examine local employment growth within the metropolitan area of 
Barcelona and report an elasticity of around -0.5 for local business and property tax rates, the 
main local taxes levied in Spain. 
 
Analyzing empirically the extent to which taxes affect firms’ location decisions is by no means 
straightforward given the range of other factors underlying this particular decision. Moreover, 
tax rates may be endogenous in the sense that tax setting governments may look at the same 
attributes that firms take into consideration at the time of locating. This possibility has been 
stressed in the literature concerned with the study of tax competition in the presence of 
agglomeration economies3. Agglomeration economies lead firms to concentrate in space 
resulting in economic activities that have been described as “lumpy”. In this setting, firms may 
                                                 
1 See Wilson (1999) for a review of the tax competition literature. 
 
2 This literature is reviewed in Bartik (1991a) and Herzog and Schlottmann (1991). 
 
3 The seminal papers are Ludema and Wooton (2000) and Kind et al. (2000). A review of this literature 
can be found in Baldwin et al. (2003), chapters 15 and 16. 
 
 indeed be willing to pay a higher tax bill in order to locate close to other firms. This means that 
some governments may be able to set a high tax rate while hosting large amounts of economic 
activity. In Figure 1 (Graphs 1 and 2), the partial correlations between tax rates (business and 
property tax) and manufacturing employment for municipalities in Catalonia, a Spanish region, 
are depicted4. These correlations are positive and large (in the 30-40% range), which is 
consistent with the intuition that agglomeration economies enable those municipalities where 
economic activities are found to set higher tax rates. While this does not constitute a test of the 
relationship between the tax level and agglomeration economies, it does suggest that accurate 
measures of the benefits firms obtain when they co-locate in space may be necessary to identify 
the effect of tax rates on the location of economic activities. 
 
Figure 1. Correlations between tax rates and manufacturing employment. 
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Notes: Data are referred to year 2000 and variables are expressed in deviations from the local labor 
market mean. 
                                                 
4 See Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for a description of data and variables. Since we focus on firm location within 
local labor markets, variables are expressed in deviations from the local labor market mean. 
 
 
 The term agglomeration economies can be used to denote any mechanism that causes economic 
activities to cluster in specific locations. At the intraregional level, the type of agglomeration 
economies we have in mind are technological externalities. Marshall (1890) identifies labor 
market pooling, input sharing and knowledge spillovers as the main sources of such 
technological externalities. However, regardless of the particular source that is operating, 
external effects mean that a firm’s productivity comes to depend on the economic scale and 
composition of its economic environment (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Fortunately, a large 
number of empirical studies have undertaken to quantify agglomeration economies of this type 
and conclude that the productivity of a firm depends on the amount of economic activities being 
carried out within the same industry (localization economies), the amount of economic activities 
being carried out within other industries (urbanization economies) and the sectoral diversity of 
the local economy (diversity effects). It has also been reported that these agglomeration 
economies have a very limited geographical scope (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). For Spain, 
Viladecans-Marsal (2004) finds little evidence of agglomeration economies spilling over the 
country’s municipal borders. This makes Spain a good setting for the analysis we propose to 
undertake as there is a close equivalence between the size of tax setting jurisdictions and the 
scope of agglomeration economies5. 
 
In his review of the role played by taxes on the location of economic activities, Bartik (1991a) 
points out that empirical studies tend to draw different conclusions according to whether these 
analyses are conducted at the intra- or the intermetropolitan level. While the former have tended 
to conclude that tax increases discourage firms from moving in, the latter have failed to produce 
a definitive result as regards the extent to which taxes affect location. These findings may not be 
independent of the difficulties that such studies face when seeking to measure interregional 
variation in key location factors such as wage levels, business climate and transportation 
facilities. However, by looking at the location of economic activities among neighboring 
municipalities, we can do away with this problem, because these variables can be assumed to 
show little variation between neighboring locations. Between very close-lying municipalities, 
location decisions are assumed to be motivated by differences in building rents, taxes and 
agglomeration economies. 
 
Most studies examining the role of taxes in the location of economic activities have focused on 
either employment levels or employment growth. However, as Bartik (1991b) points out, it 
might be preferable to study a particular location decision rather than to model employment 
levels and changes. By focusing on a particular decision, rather than modelling the aggregate 
                                                 
5 We focus our analysis on the Spanish region of Catalonia. 
 
 result of the creation, closure, expansion and contraction of plant processes, it should be 
possible to impose greater structure on the analysis and, hence, yield more precise estimates of 
the effects that are of interest to us. In line with Carlton (1983), Bartik (1985) and a series of 
more recent papers by Guimaraes and co-authors (2000, 2002 and 2004), we adopt the random 
profit maximization framework to analyse the location decision of new establishments. This 
empirical strategy has at least two advantages. First, Schmenner’s (1982) study reveals that 
managers will first decide whether or not to start-up a new establishment and only then will they 
take a decision regarding the location that best suits their needs. This means we can focus on an 
establishment’s location decision in isolation of any consideration of the processes underlying 
the decision to start-up. Second, it enables us to consider the explanatory variables as being pre-
determined and thus to avoid any endogeneity considerations as regards the regressors. In this 
paper we focus on the location of manufacturing establishments, which has the additional 
advantage that demand remains unchanged within the region as manufactured outputs are 
targeted at national or supranational markets (Erickson and Wasylenko, 1980; and Charney, 
1983). Hence, we are able to abstract from any local demand considerations that may affect the 
location decision of firms. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, following on from this introduction, 
we present a model that sets up the location problem of the firm in line with Carlton (1983). 
Then, an empirical application follows. We describe the dataset and variables in Section 3.1 and 
then introduce and explain the econometric specification in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we 
discuss the results obtained. In Section 4, we present a summary and the main conclusions of 
this paper. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
The aim of a competitive firm belonging to industry s is to choose simultaneously a location and 
a level of inputs that yield the highest level of profits. There are J jurisdictions each firm can 
choose to locate in and, conditional on locating in j, the problem of the firm i is to choose the 
level of machinery (K), labor (L) and buildings (N) that maximize the following profit function: 
 
         ),,( iiisjijiili NKLTNRKrLwYP −⋅−⋅−⋅−⋅                               (1) 
 
The price of a manufactured output ( P ) is assumed to be common for all firms in the region. 
The prices of the three inputs used by firms are expected to vary at different geographic levels 
due to different degrees of mobility. The rental price of machinery ( r ) is assumed to show no 
 
 variation within the region. Wages are assumed to vary across local labor markets (wl), whereas 
the rent of industrial buildings (Rj) may differ from one location to another. The local tax bill 
( ) depends on the level of all the inputs considered and the industry of the firm, s. Output is 
denoted by Y  which is assumed to be obtained by the following decreasing returns to scale 
homogeneous production function of the Cobb-Douglas form: 
sjT
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where 132k 1 + <+≡ αα α  denotes the returns to scale of the production function;  is a 
Hicks’ neutral productivity shifter capturing the agglomeration economies of site j for firms 
whose activity falls into industry s; 
sjA
iμ  pins down the managerial ability of the firm in the terms 
defined in Mundlak (1978); ijε  stands for an identically and independently distributed (iid) zero 
mean Weibull random variable that changes over firms and locations; and δ  is a positive 
constant. 
 
The problem of simultaneously choosing a location and the optimal level of inputs can be 
reduced through the restricted profit function to one in which firms choose the location where 
the level of profits is the highest when inputs are chosen optimally. This is equivalent to 
choosing the location where the log of the restricted profit function, scaled by δ/)1( k− , takes 
its highest value: 
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where  is the restricted profit function and Π 0ϕ  stands for a constant term. To accommodate 
expression (3) into the random profit maximization framework, the following normalizations 
are carried out. Notice that the units of machinery can be set in such a way that the price is unity 
(i.e., 1=r ). Given that λλ ≈+ )1ln(  for low values of λ , it must be that for low tax rates, as 
is the case here, )/ln( KTr sj ∂∂+  approaches KTsj ∂∂ /  if K is set at the appropriate scale. We 
assume that within a region, wages do show variation but within certain limits. Hence, by 
choosing the appropriate scale for the units of labor, the wage can be redefined as one plus a 
 
 wage premium ( ll ww ~1+= ). The same reasoning can be applied to the rents of buildings 
( ). After these normalizations, expression (3) can be expressed as:  jj RR
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where 201 −=ϕϕ . Expression (4) is a conditional logit model whose parameters can be 
estimated, up to a δ/1  scale, by maximum likelihood. As Bartik (1985) points out, it makes 
sense that the estimates are up to some scale since doubling the profits at all sites leaves the 
selection probabilities unchanged. McFadden (1974) shows that given the assumption regarding 
ijε , the probability that firm i locates in j is given by: 
 
                    ∑ ε−πε−π=
j
isjisjisjisjij )exp(/)exp(p                                        (5) 
 
where the variables that do not show variation across locations (i.e. iP μϕ ,,1 ) drop out of the 
analysis. 
 
 
3. Empirical exercise 
 
3.1. Data and variables 
 
The empirical analysis is carried out using a rich dataset containing information on the universe 
of new and relocating manufacturing establishments settling in Catalonia, a Spanish region, 
between 1996 and 20036. This dataset, the Industrial Establishments Registry, contains 
information on the establishments created including data concerning employment, location and 
activity. The level of sectoral disaggregation considered is the 2-digit industry classification 
yielding 18 manufacturing industries7. In Table 1, we report the number of establishment entries 
and the number of municipalities for which data are available. Roughly speaking, we are dealing 
                                                 
6Catalonia is a region of north-east Spain. In 1999, it had 6.2 million inhabitants living in 946 
municipalities. The surface area is 32 thousand km2. 
 
7 The Industrial Establishments Registry uses the 3-digit industry classification. However, data on local 
employment from the Social Security Register is only available at the 2-digit level. Therefore, the 
analysis is performed at this latter level of sectoral disaggregation. 
 
 
 with municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants hosting some type of industrial activity8. 
The municipal data sources, variable definitions and summary statistics are provided in Table 2. 
Table 1. Number of new establishments and municipalities by year. 
Variable 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
New establishments (all) 1319 1664 1733 1065 1175 926 1127 1163 
New establishments 
(small)1 567 620 716 432 441 392 380 368 
New establishments 
(large)2 751 1,032 1,009 626 734 524 731 765 
Municipalities 259 396 414 412 410 636 631 631 
Notes: 1. Small (1-3 workers). 2. Large (  4 workers). 2. Employment data is missing for  ≥
those new establishments not included in either of the two categories. 
 
 
Table 2. Definition of municipal variables. Data sources and descriptive statistics. 
1999 Variable Definition Data sources 
mean st. dev
1.357 0.187 Ministry of 
economics 
municipal yearbooks 
(1995-1999) & data-
base (2000-2002) 
Municipal coefficient to 
be applied to a presumed 
firm-specific level of 
profits 
Business tax rate;  bjτ
Nominal property tax 
rate;  pjt
Nominal property tax rate Property 
Assessment Office 
0.567 0.154 
Assessed value per unit 
of surface;  jv
Mean of the ratable value 
of buildings  
Property 
Assessment office 
20.898 14.388
Property 
Assessment office 
12.145 8.486 Property tax rate;  pjτ jpj vt ⋅  
Social Security 
Register 
4.128 2.317 Manufacturing 
employment; mj
ln of workers employed in 
manufacturing activities 
Non-manufacturing 
employment; sej
ln of workers employed in 
non-manufacturing 
activities 
Social Security 
Register 
4.462 2.173 
Diversity index; dj ln of the inverse of a H-H 
index of sectoral 
concentration 
Social Security 
Register 
4.890 2.957 
Manufacturing ratio of 
labor to buildings 
surface; Lj/Nj
Manufacturing workers 
over square meters of 
industrial buildings 
Catalan Institute of 
Statistics & Social 
Security Register 
0.053 0.177 
 
 
                                                 
8 There is a substantial increase in the number of municipalities for which data are available in year 2000. 
This is due to the fact that business tax rates are only available for those municipalities exceeding 1,000 
inhabitants before this date. 
 
 
 Local taxes: Local governments in Spain are moderate in size (their expenditure represents 
13% of total public expenditure), with only a third of local government budgets being funded by 
intergovernmental grants. More than half of their own revenues are raised by taxes, while the 
remainder consists of user charges. The property tax (Impuesto sobre la propiedad immueble) is 
the main source of collected tax revenue (half of all revenues), although it is small in 
comparison to the U.S. Whereas an average U.S. property owner is charged around 0.75% of the 
market value of their property9, in Spain this falls to about 0.14%10. The local business tax 
(Impuesto sobre actividades económicas), the second largest source of revenue (18% of local 
tax revenue), is the largest local tax firms have to bear. To indicate the relative size of these two 
taxes we compute the average tax bills per unit of establishment surface for Catalonia. The 
business tax is equivalent to 4.5€/m2, while this measure falls to 2.25€/m2 in the case of the 
property tax11. Manufacturing establishments average 790 m2 in our sample. For such an 
establishment, this yields bills of around 1,800 and 3,600€ for property and business taxes, 
respectively. Three other taxes complete the picture of local taxation: a tax on vehicles, a tax on 
building activities, and a tax on the sale of land and buildings12. Although the revenue raised by 
these three taxes is not negligible, it should be noted that only a share of them, presumably 
small, is borne by business activities. 
 
When local taxes are considered as a whole, the burden that the business sector has to bear is 
significant. If we only consider business and property taxes, together they yield a local tax bill 
of around 0.45% of the market value of a firm’s buildings (in the case of the remaining taxes, 
we are completely unaware of the share of revenue that the business sector has to bear). 
Although this level of local taxation is low in comparison to that of the U.S., the difference in 
the order of magnitude is not so great. Besides, municipal governments are given remarkable 
                                                 
9 According to the U.S. Census of Communities 2005, the median home value in 2005 was 213,900 $ 
whereas the median real estate tax was 1,614 $. 
 
10 Data refer to 2003. The average home market value in Spain was 193,100 € while the average ratable 
value was 35,000 €. Data sources are the Sociedad de Tasación, a firm providing valuations of real estate 
properties, and the Property Assessment Office. The 0.14 percentage is obtained as 
(35,000/193,100)*0.0077, where 0.0077 is the mean (population weighted) of the nominal property tax 
rate. 
 
11 The business tax equivalent is the result of dividing total business tax revenue by the sum of the surface 
of all business establishments. To obtain an idea of the property tax bill per unit of surface is not so 
straightforward as the share of this tax revenue paid by business is unknown. We have aggregated the 
surface of residential and business properties to compute a measure of the property tax per unit of surface 
(assuming that businesses pay as much as home owners per unit of surface). On average, we obtain a 
property tax bill of 2.25€/m2. Sources are the Catalan Institute of Statistics and the Ministry of 
Economics. 
 
12 Municipalities are under no obligation to levy the latter two taxes. 
 
 
 tax autonomy. Statutory tax rates can vary by a two to three-fold factor across municipalities. 
Bearing in mind that we are analyzing the location of firms in neighboring municipalities, we 
expect local tax differentials to be large enough to influence the location of new establishments. 
In this analysis we focus solely on the property and business taxes, the main local taxes paid by 
business13. Therefore, we can characterize the local tax liability of firm i of the sth industry in 
municipality j as  where b and p stand for the business and property taxes, 
respectively. The business tax bill depends on all the inputs used by the firm whereas the 
property tax bill is only increasing in the usage of buildings. Therefore, we can write 
p
isj
b
isjisj TTT +≈
LTsj ∂∂ /  
as  and  as  while LT bsj ∂∂ / KTsj ∂∂ / KT bsj ∂∂ / NTsj ∂∂ /  decomposes as + . NT bsj ∂∂ / NT psj ∂∂ /
 
The local business tax liability of each firm ( ) is based on a presumed level of profits that is 
established in accordance with the observed level of input usages and the economic sector of 
each firm
b
isjT
14. This presumed level of profits is determined by national tax laws that do not make 
any distinction as regards location. This industry specific level of tax liability 
) is then modified at the municipal level by being multiplied by a 
coefficient set by local governments ( )
i
N
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K
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L
s NKL ⋅+⋅+⋅ φφφ(
b
jτ 15. Hence, we can characterize the tax bill for a firm i 
belonging to industry s in municipality j as  where  
,  and  measure the way in which national tax laws assess how profits in industry s 
increase differently with an extra unit of labor, machinery and buildings, respectively. Hence, it 
is possible to decompose  into two 
terms, an industry-specific constant (i.e. ) times the 
municipal business tax rate, . Moreover, this constant captures the percentage squeeze on 
b
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13 In the results section (3.3), we address the role of the remaining local taxes. However, these are found 
to be statistically insignificant and their exclusion does not affect our results. Therefore, we focus solely 
on the business and property taxes. 
 
14 The business tax code proxies labor with the number of workers, machinery with power capacity and 
building surface area with m2 of establishments. 
 
15 This municipal tax rate can be raised or cut depending on the location of the firm within the 
municipality. Each local government can sort streets into a small number of categories. Then, a specific 
business tax rate is applied to the firms located in each of these street categories. Municipalities are also 
entitled to offer tax cuts to benefit new establishments during their first years of trading. However, 
municipal data on the business tax code other than the municipal tax rate are poor and not very 
informative. Therefore, we summarize the business tax burden in location j by means of the municipal 
business tax rate, . bjτ
 
 
 profit levels when the municipal business tax rate increases by one unit. If this share is similar 
across sectors (after all, the business tax is levied on a presumed level of profits for all 
industries), then this coefficient can be expected to be roughly the same for all sectors. The 
business tax rate can range from 0.8 to 1.9. There exists substantial cross-section variation in 
this variable. In 1999, a quarter of municipalities set a business tax rate below 1.1 whereas 
another quarter chose a rate that was above 1.4 (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). 
 
The local business tax was reformed by a law passed in 2002. From 2003 onwards, all self-
employed and very small firms, with sales below 1 million €, became exempt from this tax. At 
the same time, the tax burden was partly shifted towards larger firms, for whom the tax burden 
increased by 30% on average16. Thus, the reform is expected to decrease the sensitivity of small 
firms to tax differentials and to increase the effect of taxes on the location of larger firms. We 
design two subsets of firms that we consider would be affected by the reform in a different 
manner: on the one hand, an establishment with 1, 2 or 3 registered employees is considered 
small, while an establishment with 4 or more workers is considered large17. The number of 
entries falling into these two categories are reported in the second and third rows of Table 1. 
 
The property tax is charged to the owners of land and building structures and no distinction is 
drawn between industrial and residential usages. The property tax bill ( ) of firm i if located 
in municipality j results from the product of the property nominal tax rate ( ) and the ratable 
value per unit of surface ( ) times the surface of buildings used, i.e. . We are 
interested in measuring how the property tax bill increases when we increase the surface of 
buildings in one unit ( ). Therefore, in this analysis, the relevant measure of the 
property tax rate is obtained as the nominal tax rate times the ratable value per unit of surface of 
industrial buildings, i.e. . Hence, we need a proxy of the ratable value of a 
representative unit of an industrial building. Unfortunately, this information is not available and, 
instead, we use the mean of the ratable value of all properties found in location j. Governments 
are free to choose a nominal tax rate between 0.4 and 1.1%. That is, property owners are asked 
to pay a share (between 0.4 and 1.1%) of the ratable value of their properties. There exists a 
great deal of heterogeneity across locations although low tax rates are generally preferred. For 
p
ijT
p
jt
jv ij
p
j
p
ij NvtT ⋅⋅=
N/T psj ∂∂
j
p
j
p
j vt ⋅≡τ
                                                 
16 Tax rates vary according to sales’ intervals. 
 
17 The effects of the reform differ with establishment sales rather than with employment. However, our 
knowledge of new establishment size is limited to the number of employees reported at the time of 
registering the establishment. We expect this measure to be highly correlated with sales. The threshold of 
4 workers was set after testing various levels. 
 
 instance in 1999, a quarter of municipal governments set a property tax rate below 0.45 whereas 
another quarter chose a tax rate above 0.7. Differences in the average ratable value of properties 
across municipalities are great and further increase property tax bill differentials (See Table 2 
for descriptive statistics). 
Agglomeration economies: Agglomeration economies for a firm of the sth industry found in 
location j, , are expected to be summarized by the following expression: sjA
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4321
0
ψψψψ ⋅⋅⋅⋅≡ jjsjsjsj DSEMOKA
 
where  stands for a constant. 0K sjO  denotes the  manufacture employment in location j 
whereas  captures the remaining manufacturing employment found in municipality j. This 
distinction is made in order to take into account the fact that the benefits for two firms from co-
localizing in space may be larger between same industry firms than between two firms that 
belong to distinct activities. The non-manufacturing employment level, , is introduced in 
order to capture the advantages manufacturing firms derive from locally provided services. The 
productivity gains derived from one’s own manufacturing employment levels ( ) are known 
in the literature as localization economies. The benefits stemming from the remaining levels of 
employment ( ) are often called urbanization economies in a distinction that dates 
back to Hoover (1936). Jacobs (1969) sustains that diverse economic environments favor the 
productivity of firms through the cross-fertilization of ideas. To test this last hypothesis we 
introduce the variable D
ths
sjM
sjSE
sjO
sjsj SEM +
j, which accounts for the diversity of the productive environment and 
which amounts to the inverse of a Hirschman-Herfindahl index that can be defined as follows: 
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where  denotes the share of the overall employment in location sjshare j  that is devoted to 
activity  (including both manufacturing and non-manufacturing activities). The larger the 
value of the index, the more diverse the described economic environment is. Equations (4) and 
(5) suggest that agglomeration economies should be considered in logs. We use o, m, se and d to 
denote the natural logarithm of O, M, SE and D. 
s
 
 
 As discussed above, agglomeration economies of the type we are looking at have been found to 
be of very limited geographical scope. Rosenthal and Strange (2003) analyze the scope of 
agglomeration economies by estimating external effects between firms localized at various 
distances. These authors find that such external effects fall sharply after the first 1.6 km. In our 
dataset, the urban area of the municipalities averages 1.3 km2 whereas the mean total surface is 
34 km2. Therefore, one can expect that external effects do not spill over municipal borders to a 
very large extent. In fact, Viladecans-Marsal (2004) finds that, for most industries, there is no 
evidence of external effects taking place between neighbouring Spanish municipalities. In 
unreported regressions we have included spatial lags of the variables of agglomeration 
economies, but the coefficients were found to be statistically insignificant. 
 
The rent of buildings: Unfortunately, we lack data on the rents of industrial buildings for the 
Spanish municipalities18. We circumvent this problem by looking at how pre-established firms 
use labor in relation to buildings. Since wages are assumed to be constant across a local labor 
market, the aggregate municipal ratio of buildings with respect to labor should provide us with 
information about the variation in the rent of buildings within local labor markets. However, we 
need to take into account the fact that different aggregate ratios of labor to square meters of 
buildings may not only be the result of differences in relative prices but could also respond to 
variations in the sectoral composition of municipalities19. If we measure the rent of buildings 
using the aggregate ratio of labor to buildings we may overstate its variation within a local labor 
market. The reason for this is that firms needing particularly large buildings will tend to gather 
in locations where buildings are relatively cheap. Therefore, we need to account for the 
aggregate ratio of labor to buildings while controlling for the sectoral composition of 
municipalities. That is: 
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s
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j
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where  is the surface occupied by manufactures in municipality j,  is employment of the 
s
jN sjL
th manufacture in j and the sκ ’s are 18 parameters to be estimated. These should be high for 
sectors using large buildings intensively (high 13 /αα  ratios) and low for sectors that have 
                                                 
18Nor can the ratable value of the property tax be used as a proxy given that reassessments are not carried 
out simultaneously in all municipalities 
 
19 This acknowledges the point stressed by Gyourko (1987) in his analysis of the between-cities variation 
in the aggregate ratio of labor to capital between cities. This author breaks the variation down into two 
phenomena: the economic sector composition of the city and the within industry factor intensity variation. 
 
 
 lower space requirements (low 13 /αα  ratios). This can be seen at a more formal level in Annex 
1. 
 
3.2. Econometric specification 
 
As yet, we have made no mention of how we capture wage differentials between local labor 
markets. However, there is no information on wage levels at this geographical scale. The way 
we proceed involves conditioning the choice set to be the local labor market in which we finally 
observe the establishment settles. The local labor markets we use are built on the basis of labor 
mobility considerations20. Thus, they reflect groups of municipalities which show high levels of 
interaction. Hence, by looking at the location of establishments within a local labor market we 
are not only controlling for wage differentials but also for unobserved location attributes that 
may show up at precisely this geographical level. These attributes may include the business 
climate, transportation facilities or access to markets. 
 
The dataset we use includes information on firms that belong to different manufactures entering 
the market at different points in time. We are interested in looking at how an establishment 
manager belonging to industry s decides in which municipality to settle in period t, 
conditionally on investing in a particular local labor market. Hence, we need to condition the 
choice of jurisdiction j on the sector, time period and local labor market that we eventually 
observe the investment to be taking place in. In line with Rosenthal and Strange (2003), we 
assume that there exists a one-year time lag between a new establishment decides where to 
locate and we observe the establishment settles in this location. Hence, we are interested in 
location probabilities of the following type: 
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where 4. and  3 2, 1,kfor  ,/1 =⋅≡ kk ψδβ ; ; NsKsLs φδαφδαφδαβ ⋅+⋅+⋅≡ / // 3215 δαβ / 36 ≡ ; 
and . ,/3 sss ∀⋅≡ κδαβ  
                                                 
20 The local labor markets to which we refer have been computed by Roca and Moix (2004). 
Municipalities are aggregated in groups according to commuting considerations. Broadly speaking, each 
local labor market is built to ensure people live and work within its boundaries. This methodology differs 
from the British Local Labor markets in that a municipality cannot in itself constitute a local labor 
market. We consider the 945 municipalities to make up 41 local labor markets. With this level of 
aggregation, approximately 75% of the people live and work in the same local labor market. 
 
  
This resembles a nested logit model which is often seen as a conditional logit where decisions 
are made sequentially. In this particular case, firm managers would first choose the local labor 
market in which to locate and would then choose the municipality that they like best within the 
local labor market. It turns out that the estimates to be obtained by the estimation of expression 
(9) are precisely the same as those that would be obtained by estimating a nested logit model. At 
this juncture, we should make two comments in this respect. First, the approach we take enables 
us to control for what Carlton (1983) calls the “birth potential” of an area. In other words, 
people are tied to a particular area and, hence, when an entrepreneur is looking where to locate a 
start-up, the additional advantages offered by a distant municipality may be offset by a personal 
preference for locations that are located more close at hand. Thus, not all jurisdictions are equal 
substitutes for each other. Given the fact that there are more entrepreneurs in large cities with 
more agglomeration economies and higher tax rates, this statistical control may be important. In 
the second place, it might be that in the case of large and very mobile firms (e.g. multinational 
plants) the choice set considered does not correspond to the actual choice set. Even if this were 
to be true, the consistency of our estimates does not rely on assuming that we are specifying the 
choice set correctly, since to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest all that we 
require is that the independence of irrelevant alternative assumptions holds between each pair of 
alternatives being considered in our estimation. 
 
The log-likelihood of the model is given by: 
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Guimaraes et al. (2003) shows that this log-likelihood function differs in a constant from the 
log-likelihood function of a Poisson model with exponential mean function whose mean and 
variance are given by the following expression: 
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 where  accounts for the number of firms of the s1+sjtn
th industry that locate in jurisdiction j 
during period t+1 and stlα  denotes a time-sectoral-Local Labor Market specific constant term21. 
The exponential mean Poisson regression model does not suffer from the incidental parameters 
problem that generally affects non-linear models (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). This implies 
that the consistency of the slope parameters does not hinge on the number of constant terms that 
needs to be fitted. 
 
3.3. Results 
 
Main results: The maximum likelihood Poisson estimates of the location determinants of new 
and relocating establishments are presented in Table 3. In the first column of Table 3, we 
present the preferred specification, specification [1], that corresponds to that of the location of 
manufacturing establishments outlined in expressions (10) and (11). Auxiliary results are 
provided in specifications [2] and [3]. 
 
Table 3.-Location determinants. Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimates. 
Dep.Variable is the count of new establishments of industry s in municipality j  
and time period t+1 (nsjt+1). 
   Variable [1] [2] [3] 
    
(i) Local tax rates       
-0.387 -0.249 2.643 Business tax rate:  bjtτ (-4.67)*** (-3.24)*** (36.39)***
-0.011 -0.009 -0.012 Property tax rate:  pjtτ (-4.90)*** -(2.55)*** (6.09)***
(ii) Agglomeration economies     
0.403 0.416 -.- Own manufacture  
(34.89)*** (41.06)***employment:osjt -.- 
Manufacturing 0.248 0.190 -.- 
(12.04)*** (11.09)***employment: msjt -.- 
Non-manufacturing 0.124 0.135 -.- 
(7.29)*** (9.53)***employment:sejt -.- 
0.224 0.261 -.- Diversity index:djt (5.36)*** (6.67)*** -.- 
Rent of buildings: 
Yes Yes Yes sNL jtsjt ∀,/  
Local Labor Market  Yes No Yes Dummies 
No. Dummies 
1,520 142 1,520 )( lts ××  
Log-likelihood -13,564 -14,585 -16,538 
                                                 
21 stlα  cannot be computed if, for industry s in time period t+1, there are no firms locating in any location 
within local labor market l. Hence, the number of observations changes over the specifications. 
 
     
No. Observations 21,914 21,914 21,914 
Notes: 1. Figures in parenthesis are z-statistics. 2.*, **, ***: statistically significant at the 
90%, 95% and 99%, respectively. 
 
 
The high number of statistically significant variables reported in specification [1] suggests that 
the model fits the data satisfactorily. A likelihood ratio test has been computed indicating that 
the model is statistically significant at any reasonable level. Moreover, the variables take the 
sign that theory predicts. That is, local taxes and the proxies used to capture the rent of buildings 
seem to discourage the arrival of firms, whereas agglomeration economies are an attribute that 
firms value at the time of looking for a location22. 
 
The two local taxes - the local business tax and the property tax - seem to be relevant 
determinants of the location of new manufacturing establishments. Both the business tax and the 
property tax coefficients are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level ( 0 , 65 <ββ ). 
Given that these variables do not enter the model in logs, the estimated coefficients do not tell 
us much about the dimensions of these effects23. Hence, we have computed the average 
elasticity for these two taxes. The estimated elasticity of the business tax rate is -0.52 whereas 
the elasticity of the property tax rate is -0.13. As mentioned, the list of papers we can compare 
our results with is extremely limited. Since the paper by Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal 
(2003) focuses on employment growth, it is difficult to assess the degree to which these results 
are comparable. Our elasticities are in general smaller than those that they report, above all in 
relation to property tax. Nevertheless, the results we report are in the same range as those found 
by these authors. In particular, the elasticity we obtain for the business tax rate is close to the 
figure they report for the overall employment growth equation (-0.5) and, similarly, we found an 
elasticity for the property tax rate that is close to the one they provide for the growth in services 
employment (-0.18). These elasticities are also small in comparison to the average result found 
in the U.S., which Bartik (1991a) quantifies at -2. However, our results do resemble those found 
in U.S. studies of the conditional logit type, for example Bartik (1985) and Guimaraes et al. 
(2004). These studies report negative elasticities that do not exceed -0.5 in general. If, in 
                                                 
22The coefficients associated with the variables that proxy the rent of buildings have been omitted to save 
space given the difficulty in interpreting them. 
 
23 When a variable is interpreted in terms of its impact on the expected number of firms locating (nsjt+1) its 
coefficient has an elasticity interpretation if the variable is measured in logs. If it is measured in levels, 
the average elasticity can be obtained by multiplying the coefficient by the sample mean of the regressor, 
sjtx⋅β . 
 
 addition, we take into account the size of the taxes considered in this analysis, we deem our 
elasticities plausible. 
 
The results also suggest that agglomeration economies play an important role as firm location 
determinants since all the coefficients of the variables of agglomeration economies are found to 
be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Since all these variables are measured in 
logs, the coefficients have an elasticity interpretation. The variable pinning down the 
localization economies (o) seems to play an important role in the firm’s location decision, 
presenting an elasticity of around 0.40. The variables capturing the urbanization economies (m 
and se) have elasticities of 0.25 and 0.12, respectively. This suggests that localization 
economies outweigh the advantages resulting from the presence of employment in distant 
economic activities. The diversity of the economic environment also shifts the productivity of 
firms, becoming a valuable attribute for firms in search of a location. The elasticity lies around 
0.22 supporting Jacobs’ hypothesis. The results obtained for the relative importance of these 
location determinants are in line with the results reported in the literature24. We have also 
computed the average marginal effects that are implicit in our agglomeration estimates in order 
to contextualize our results more closely with other studies25. Our localization economies’ 
estimate implies that 100 extra workers in a particular industry will increase the expected 
number of start-ups in the same industry by 0.097. In the case of urbanization economies, a 100-
worker increase outside the industry increases the number of start-ups by 0.04 if these are 
manufacturing workers and 0.01, otherwise. These estimates are in the upper limit of the results 
reported by Rosenthal and Strange (2003). One possible explanation is that, unlike these 
authors, we hold rents and taxes at a fixed level. 
 
In the second column of Table 3, we report the results obtained when we do not restrict the 
choice set to the local labor market level. When the choice set is considered to be the entire 
region of Catalonia, some coefficient estimates do change, if not always dramatically. In 
particular, the coefficients (and the elasticities) of the business tax rate and the property tax rate 
drop by 55 and 22%, respectively. This suggests that the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption does not hold at the regional level. This can also be tested statistically. The second 
row from the bottom in Table 3 reports the log-likelihood functions of the different 
specifications. Since specification [2] is obtained by keeping the sector-year-local labor market 
dummy variables equal regardless of the local-labor market of the municipality, a likelihood 
                                                 
24 See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a review of this literature. 
 
25 If the variable xsjt is expressed in logs, the average marginal effect can be obtained as )x/n(β sjtsjt⋅  
where sjtn  is the sample mean of the dependent variable.  
 
 ratio test can be performed. The value this test takes is over 2,000 which clearly exceeds the 
critical value of a Chi-Square distribution with 1,378 degrees of freedom at the 1% level. Hence, 
our data seem to indicate that there are important location factors that show up in the local labor 
market or/and, for some entrepreneurs, not all municipalities are equal substitutes for each other. 
This supports our empirical strategy of restricting the choice set to nearby locations. 
 
Specification [3], whose results are reported in the third column of Table 3, omits the 
agglomeration economies’ variables. The point of running such a regression is to assess the 
consequences of failing to account for the benefits firms obtain from the economic scale and 
composition of different locations. The property tax estimate remains unchanged. In contrast, 
the business tax effect switches sign becoming positive (and statistically significant at the 1% 
level). Moreover, the implied elasticity is very large (exceeding 3). The fact that municipalities 
hosting large amounts of economic activities can set higher tax rates and still be preferred by 
new locating establishments may explain this large bias. This finding shows the importance of 
controlling for agglomeration economies when estimating the effects of taxes on the location of 
economic activities. 
 
Robustness checks and additional results: In this subsection we first explore whether the 
estimates are sensitive to the empirical strategy we adopt to control for the rent of buildings. 
The implications of omitting the level of some particular public expenditure programmes are 
then addressed. We then proffer some comments regarding the inclusion of some other local 
taxes, before extending the analysis in two directions. First, we consider small and large firms, 
separately (Table 4). The main point of this exercise is to confirm that the reform passed in 
2002 has affected small and large firms in a very asymmetric manner. Second, we explore the 
role of taxes on the location of service activities. 
 
Since, to the best of our knowledge, there are no papers that control for the rent of buildings by 
looking at how pre-established firms use labor with respect to buildings’ surface, we estimate 
specification [1] using the density of the population as a proxy of building rents. This approach 
has been used in Bartik (1985) and Guimaraes et al. (2004), the rationale being that population 
and manufactures compete for the use of land. Density takes the correct sign if higher densities 
are to pick up higher building rents. Although some coefficient estimates experience non-
negligible changes, the sign and order of magnitude of the estimates remain unchanged, 
providing our analysis with consistency. 
 
Bartik (1991a) points out that controlling for the level of some local public expenditures can be 
relevant for identification purposes (i.e. higher tax bills may be financing better services which 
 
 are valued by firms). Unfortunately, we lack data on current expenditures in which we can 
identify the programmes that firms may be particularly interested in. Hence, we are not able to 
address this question, empirically. However, we feel that this is not a major issue in our analysis 
as, in Spain, inter-municipal differences in per capita tax revenue do not stem so much from 
differences in municipal tax efforts. Rather, they arise from differences in fiscal capacity and in 
the volume of unconditional grants received from upper-level governments26. As a robustness 
check, we have included the natural log of overall public expenditure per capita in specification 
[1]. Although the expenditure per capita coefficient is positive, its elasticity is very small and 
statistically insignificant and, moreover, produces no significant changes in the parameters of 
interest. The inclusion of the remaining local taxes, namely the vehicle tax, the building 
activities tax and the tax on sales of land and buildings has also been considered. These taxes 
have been found to be statistically insignificant and to have no effect on our estimates of 
interest. This may be due to the fact that these taxes represent very light burdens. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2, from 2003 onwards, all self-employed and very small firms have 
become tax exempt, while the tax burden on larger firms has been increased. As such the reform 
is expected to decrease the sensitivity of small firms to tax differentials and increase the effect 
of taxes on the location of larger firms. We, therefore, estimate the model for small and large 
firms separately while specifying two different slopes for the business tax27. One slope is for 
firms entering the market in the time period spanning 1996-2002 when the pre-reform business 
tax law applied. The second slope is for establishments locating in 2003 when we expect most 
managers would have considered the new tax code, the final details of which were made known 
in October 2002. The results obtained for small and large firms are reported in the first two 
columns of Table 4 (specifications [4] and [5]). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 The correlation between overall expenditure per capita and the tax rates is around 16% and 24% for the 
business and the property taxes, respectively. 
 
27 See Section 3.1 for a definition of small and large firms. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.-Location determinants for small and large establishments. 
Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimates. Dep. Variable is the count of new 
establishments of industry s in municipality j and time period t+1 (nsjt+1). 
Small Large Small Large    Variable   [4]   [5]   [6]   [7] 
 
(i) Local tax rates 
Business tax rate:  bjtτ
-0.559 -0.237       Business pre-reform  -.- -.- (-4.08)*** (-2.13)**      (1996-2002) 
-0.599 -0.134                    Pre-election -.- -.- (-4.06)***                   (1996-2000) (-1.15) 
-0.426 -0.562        Post-election -.- -.- (-1.86)* (-3.12)**       (2001-2002) 
-0.332 -0.607       Business post-reform  -0.329 -0.612 
      (2003) (-1.02) (-2.82)*** (-1.01) (-2.84)***
-0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 Property tax rate:  pjtτ (-3.14)*** (-4.16)*** (-3.10)*** (-4.25)***
(ii) Agglomeration economies 
0.342 0.437 0.342 0.437 Own manufacture 
(17.93)*** (29.84)*** (17.93)*** (29.84)***employment: osjt
Manufacturing 0.146 0.315 0.146 0.315 
(4.63)*** (11.51)*** (4.63)*** (11.52)***employment: msjt
Non-manufacturing 0.245 0.048 0.244 0.050 
(9.06)*** (2.14)* (9.01)*** (2.22) **employment: sejt
0.339 0.165 0.340 0.164 Diversity index: djt (4.95)*** (3.081)* (4.96)*** (3.07)*
Rent of buildings: 
Yes Yes Yes Yes ( ) sNL jtsjt ∀,/
Local Labor Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    Market dummies 
No. Dummies 
1,022 1,140 1,022 1,140 )( lts ××  
Log-likelihood -6,898 -9,693 -6,898 -9,691 
No. Observations 18,010 19,558 18,010 19,558 
Notes: 1. Figures in parenthesis are z-statistics. 2.*, **, ***:  statistically significant at the 90%, 
95% and 99%, respectively. 
 
Our results suggest that small firms were more sensitive to business tax rate differentials than 
their larger counterparts during the pre-reform period. While the average elasticity implied by 
 
 the coefficients for large firms approaches -0.32, the elasticity found for small firms stands at 
around -0.75. This suggests that, during this period, the business tax liability for a small firm 
represented a larger share of its profits than was the case for a larger firm. By contrast, the 
elasticity of the property tax rate appears to be equal for small and large firms, -0.14. As 
expected, our results suggest that the reform has reduced the sensitivity of small firms to tax 
differentials. In fact, the estimated coefficient for the post-reform period is not statistically 
different from zero. Results in the opposite direction are found for the subset of large firms. The 
reform has increased their sensitivity to business tax differentials. The elasticity of interest rises 
remarkably, from -0.32 to -0.82. Notice that this set of results corroborates the nature of the 
effects of the business tax and, therefore, enhances the consistency of this analysis. 
 
Although the reform was passed in 2002, it constituted a cornerstone of the electoral campaign 
run by the conservative party that won the national election by a wide margin in March 2000. 
This means that establishments locating in 2001 and 2002 might have partly anticipated the 
effects of the reform. To determine whether this was the case, we split the pre-reform business 
tax slope into two different coefficients - one for firms entering the market in the time period 
spanning 1996-2000 (pre-election), and the other for new establishments in search of a location 
in 2001 and 2002 when managers might have anticipated the effects of the reform (post-
election). Our results are shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 4 (specifications [6] 
and [7]). The estimates of the business tax for firms locating in 2001 and 2002 have been found 
to lie between the pre-election and post-reform period estimates for both small and large firms. 
This supports the idea that, during 2001 and 2002, the reform was partly anticipated. 
 
In the case of agglomeration economies, there are relevant differences in how small and large 
firms value the characteristics of the economic environment of locations. Employment in 
services (sej) and the diversity of the economic environment (dj) seem to be two attributes small 
firms place considerable weight on (the elasticities are 0.24 and 0.34, respectively). By contrast, 
large firms seem to care less about these location features (the coefficients are, respectively, 5 
and 2 times smaller). A possible interpretation of these results is that large firms are less 
dependent on external services and on tacit knowledge than small firms. Large firms seem to be 
fonder of manufacture employment than their smaller counterparts. This holds both for own 
industry (oj) and other manufacturing employment (mj). For the variable reflecting localization 
economies (oj) the estimated elasticities are 0.43 and 0.34, respectively. In the case of other 
manufacturing employment (mj), the elasticities are 0.31 and 0.15. 
 
Although this analysis has focused on manufactures for the reasons outlined above, we have 
also explored the role of taxes on the location of services. We choose to do so because first 
 
 services account for more than half of the total employment, second because a growing number 
of services do not need to be consumed locally and, finally, because it enables us to 
contextualize the results more effectively. In order to take into account the fact that demand for 
services may show variation at the local level, we include the population and a measure of the 
local income level in the regression, in line with Erickson and Wasylenko (1980). The estimated 
tax elasticities are of the same order of magnitude as those obtained for manufactures although 
the business tax rate estimate is found to be statistically insignificant. These elasticities are -0.28 
and -0.18 for the business and the property tax, respectively. This finding is at odds with the 
results reported by Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2003) which differed significantly 
between a very large impact of taxes on manufactures and a much more moderate effect on the 
services side of the economy. Higher levels of manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
employment as well as diversified economic environments seem to attract new service 
establishments. This is consistent with both an external economies and a local demand 
explanation. By contrast, the variables included to capture differences in demand at the 
municipal level (population and income) are statistically not different from zero. As recognized 
by Newman and Sullivan (1983), even though some activities may not export their output 
beyond the local level, mobility among nearby jurisdictions ensures that both demand and the 
cost of factors, aside from the rent of buildings, can be assumed to show little cross-sectional 
variation at this geographical level. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this study we have focused on the role of local taxes in determining the location of new 
manufacturing establishments in neighboring municipalities, while accounting for the presence 
of agglomeration economies. The empirical application we carry out, using Spanish 
municipalities’ data, has two main advantages. First, in light of the results reported by Rosenthal 
and Strange (2003) and Viladecans-Marsal (2004), the Spanish case represents a setting in 
which there is probably a good match between the size of the tax setting jurisdiction and the 
geographic scope of agglomeration economies. Second, it sheds some extra light on a topic that 
has not received a great deal of attention in the European context. 
 
The estimated tax elasticity for the business tax is close to -0.52. Significantly lower is our 
estimated elasticity for the property tax, which is around -0.13. The size of these effects is in the 
lower bound of the results reported by Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2003) for Spain. 
Given the quantitative importance of these local taxes in Spain, we consider our estimates to be 
reasonable. A reform of the business tax that was implemented during our period of study 
 
 shifted part of the tax burden from small to larger firms. Our results suggest that this reform has 
decreased the sensitivity of small firms to tax differentials, whereas the opposite is true for large 
firms. This enhances the consistency of our estimates. 
 
Restricting the choice set to the local labor market and, above all, accounting for the presence of 
agglomeration economies is of paramount importance for identifying the role of local taxes in 
the location of economic activities. In particular, the omission of the variables of the 
agglomeration economies results in a severe underestimation of the negative effect of the 
business tax on the location of manufactures. This can be explained by the fact that 
municipalities choosing high tax rates are also hosting large amounts of economic activities and, 
due to the existence of agglomeration economies, these are the preferred alternatives for new 
locating establishments. 
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 Annex 1. 
 
Hotelling’s lemma and equation [3] allows us to equate the following expressions for labor and 
buildings, respectively: 
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Solving for  in equations (A.1) and (A.2) and equating them yields an expression for the 
before-tax building bill of firm i. To account for the fact that different sectors may use inputs 
with different intensities we introduced industry subscripts in the shares of inputs in output. 
ijΠ
 
            
sj
b
sjl
l
p
sj
b
sjj
j
s
lisjjisj
)L/Tw(
w
)N/TN/TR(
R
wLRN
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂∂+
∂∂+∂∂+⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
α
α⋅⋅=⋅
1
3           (A.3) 
 
Adding up for all the firms in location j that belong to activity s we obtained the aggregate 
before-tax building bill for industry s: 
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Aggregating for all industries we find that the rent of industrial buildings in location j can be 
written as: 
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ς  is a constant term that needs to be introduced to take into account that L and N have been set 
at a particular scale. It is important to notice that this particular method for measuring the rent of 
buildings relies on the fact that the last term of expression (A.4) does not show significant 
variation across locations. This will occur when local taxes do not affect, to a significant extent, 
the ratio between the marginal costs of buildings and labor. We expect this to be the case. 
According to our estimates the business tax outweighs the property tax by a three-fold factor in 
terms of its effects on the behavior of firms. But notice that a business tax increase raises the 
marginal cost of buildings as well as the marginal cost of labor. Hence, differences across 
locations in the last term of expression (A.4) will tend to be small. 
 
